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Machiavellian and Hobbesian Concepts of Power and Its Relationship to Politics | ![]() |
Niccolò Bernardo di Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes were both upper level bureaucrats who, in their prime, were connected with the most powerful leaders of their respective states. Both were thrust from office in the midst of civil upheaval, the former tortured and then forbidden from travel, the latter exiled. Neither would ever again hold political office. It is from the chaos that enveloped their own lives that both Machiavelli and Hobbes would derive their craving for stability, their overshadowing thirst for order. This in turn was to be reflected in their definitions and descriptions of power, politics, and the relationship thereof, coming to conclusions both similar and disparate. This document is an attempt to explain the basic concepts of power and politics in the works of both Machiavelli and Hobbes, thus creating a framework for the understanding of these concepts as understood through the eyes of these two "Fathers of Realism." I have broken this document into a number of particular sections examining the natural condition and motivations of humanity along with the basic concepts of power enunciated by both, motivations of the state, the forms of the state and its right use of power as the means to the state's ends. In each section I shall begin by discussing the concepts of Machiavelli and then will juxtapose them against the work of Hobbes, thus creating a general outline of the ideas of both writers while providing an ordered means of comparison. Realist Perceptions of Human Nature, Motivations, & Power In order to understand how Machiavelli and Hobbes approach the use of power it is important to examine their individual perspectives on human nature. Machiavelli was generally quite pessimistic concerning human nature, noting, as W.T. Jones does, that "most men are stupid and irrational, quite incapable of governing themselves intelligently."(1) Humans are driven by, "fear and envy, by desire for novelty, by love of wealth, by hatred of any kind of restriction of their actions, and by a desire for security."(2) Hobbes would no doubt agree with Machiavelli concerning the natural human disposition. Émile Bréhier comments by saying that "Hobbes held that men . . . were sinister beasts of prey that could be subdued only by the absolute ruler . . . [and was] unwilling to admit that any charitable or altruistic impulse in men given, through sin, to concupiscence could have its source outside of divine grace."(3) Yet an important difference exists between Machiavelli and Hobbes: the State of Nature. Hobbes states that humanity exists naturally in a state of absolute freedom and equality (the equality being derived from each human being's equal capacity to kill other human beings). The State of Nature gives all humans the right to use whatever power they can conjure to get or do whatever they wish, a right which gives every human being the right to dominate every other human being. This creates a sort of "war of all" (bellum omnium contra omnes) in which everyone is continually at war with all others.(4) As Dante Germino puts it, "Hobbes sees him [man] as possessed by evil inclinations that are not evil in themselves, but which can lead to evil results if they are not controlled."(5) Machiavelli recognizes another drive of human behavior: ambition. In Book I, Chapter 37 of the Discourses, Machiavelli states: For when men are
not necessitated to fight, they Ambition is thus an unending motivation which continually forces the human being to act in a self-concerned fashion once that human being has managed to acquire those things necessary for survival. The desires for wealth, honor, and power which Aristotle long enunciated as the prime impetuses of human action are again reiterated by Machiavelli. He notes that those without power (the ruled) simply desire to not be dominated and act accordingly, while those with power (the rulers) desire to dominate.(7) This is a version of the concept of libido dominandi, the desire to dominate for the sake of domination. Hobbes goes into further detail on the concept of libido dominandi, as Holmes says:
The desire to dominate, just as the other desires, is not in and of itself evil, but leads to evil if misappropriated. By studying Machiavelli's scripts we may expostulate that the stimulants of fear, envy, novelty, the need for security, greed, the desire for honor and personal freedom, and the libido dominandi dominate human motivations, which in turn allows us to reasonably assume that the satisfaction of these desires, though impossible, is the ends of human actions. Therefore "power" is simply the means of pursuing and acquiring desired ends. The end result of this is clear: in order to acquire even the basic needs of life, much less satiate the libido dominandi human beings create states. For Hobbes, power is itself divisible. Initially, Hobbes differentiates between physical and political power. Physical power is the "capacity to move or alter physical objects in conformity with our will."(9) On the other hand, political power is "a capacity to move or alter the will of other people to produce results in conformity with our own will." Physical power is exercised by a ruler only in the instance that the ruler is with his or her own hands physically doing something, such as actually killing an enemy in the midst of a war. Political power is accomplished, in Hobbes' mind, through the use of fear as a motivation. The ruler uses the threat of punishment as a means of motivating the ruled to act in accordance to the ruler's will. Thus, the ruler is motivating the ruled to act through changing the will of the ruled. If the ruler holds a weapon above the head of an individual to use the threat of death in order to make the individual's will come into accord with the will of the ruler, this is political power. It becomes an exertion of the physical power only in the instance that the ruler actually strikes the individual and thus alters something directly (the body of the individual). Political power, as Hobbes conceives of it, may be procured in one of three principal manners: acquisition, institution, and Dominion Paternall. Acquired power is simply that power which is derived from natural force. It is thus inherently coercive and solely aimed at the preservation of self. Power derived through consent (the social contract) is institutional: it is created through a mutual agreement between the ruler and the ruled and is ultimately concerned with self-preservation as well, yet it is created through rational application of power and structure so that all who fulfill the contract may escape the war of all.(10) It is important to note that regardless of through what means power is ultimately derived, it bestows similar rights and consequences on the ruler, a point which Hobbes uses to insist that an unjust state (tyranny, aristocracy, tyranny of the majority, etc.) is equally legitimate to a just state (monarchy, oligarchy or republic, democracy, etc.). It should also be noted that Hobbes distinguishes between these two types of power and the Dominion Paternall, which is simply the power of the parent over the child. This particular type of power is technically political, yet cannot and should not be used as a model for the state, in Hobbes' opinion.(11) Motivations of the State The state exists for a reason: to pursue some ends, to do something. The question of what is now at the forefront. Machiavelli would indicate to us that states are essentially synthesizations of the multiple individuals who compose them, therefore the motivation of the state is, in its simplest form, to pursue the interests of the rulers of the states. This is best done through seeking three basic courses of action: the stabilization of the state, the temporal preservation of the state(12), and the expansion of the state(13). Stabilization is the object of the state because a stable and ordered society consequently is a powerful state, therefore it shall be more capable of allowing the rulers to acquire their own ends. The Preservation of the state temporally exists as the aim of the state because the rulers of the state naturally seek to extend their power as much as possible, not only in mass but through time, thus those policies which extend the state best suit the ruler. The end of expansion of the state is an end for similar reasons as stabilization and temporal preservation, save that it seeks the expansion of power through the spacial realm. Machiavelli also says that by properly building a state that rationally follows these ends the state will also benefit the ruled people within the state, due to the fact that an increase in the prosperities of the state should be shared not only between the rulers but among the ruled as well.(14) This is rational because the ruler will increase the overall stability of the state (and his or her place in the eyes of the people), therefore benefiting him- or herself in the end. Thus, Machiavelli has produced a realist argument for humanistic government in his state run based on enlightened self-interest. To discuss the Hobbesian ends of the state we must first delve into the state of nature again. Humanity is miserable, continually at war with itself, lacking any purpose or security. Therefore it seeks to create state that the war of all will be brought to an end. The sole means of doing this, enunciates Hobbes, is through the establishment of a social contract. This social contract creates an order where previously there was naught but chaos.(15) For Hobbes, the state of nature is an organic state of chaos which must be overlaid with a rational and mechanistic structure, the state, given aim and stability by the irrevocable rule of a despotic government. State Structure and the Use of Power in Pursuit of the State's Ends Political philosophers are often utopian dreamers, people who seek to alter the very character of humanity, molding it with their dreams and visions of how humanity should be. Machiavelli is not this kind of philosopher. He feels that the work of most writers in political thought, theory, and philosophy is, for the most part, worthless. To create idle dreams of changing humanity in a primary and elementary fashion is worthless. Time is better spent on studying the lessons of history in an effort to understand the essential character of the human, of politics, and of power. It is only by examining the world realistically that one can create laws and theorems which will apply to humanity in a usable fashion. Machiavelli conceives of humanity as both moral and immoral. Humanity exists in city-states, empires, papal states, states which are both secular and theocratic, mixed states, oligarchies, democracies, and monarchies. Some states depend on stable forms of economy. Others do not. Some states are expansionist, some are xenophobic isolationist. Humanity comes in a vast array of forms, despite the apparently uniform motivations which drive its every member. Furthermore, no state is static and unchanging. All states undergo periods of morality and justice, degradation, and finally collapse, only to be replaced by a new entity, perhaps reminiscent of the former, perhaps not. States evolve in cyclic patterns, says Machiavelli. They will never achieve perfection, an earthly heaven.(16) Thus the best we can do is follow the ends of the state enunciated earlier: stabilization, preservation, and expansion. This requires flexibility. Flexibility in system is one of Machiavelli's major concerns. Different situations require different state structures. If a state has a highly educated and moral populace with a grave sense of duty and justice, excellent laws and a well-trained popular militia, it is capable of supporting a democracy. If a state is dominated by a large and powerful aristocratic social structure, than it is likely to be able to support an oligarchy. A new state, chaotic, immoral, without aim or unity, surrounded by other states intent on usurption and plagued by the remaining factions of the old order, then a strong monarchy is called for. The diversity of situations in which states find themselves leads to a diversity of solutions to the problem of state structure. Flexibility is the key to survival. This need for flexibility recommends something to Machiavelli which is in fact an echo of something a man named Aristotle spoke long before. The most flexible state is that which is a mixed state, a state combining the elements of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, creating an internal tension and balance which give the state both stability and a level of internal competition which will lead maximum rationality and compromise. The mixing of systems is the best possible formula for the survival of the state.(17) Furthermore the ruler must be willing to use amoral means to achieve moral ends. If the ruler is unwilling to do so than the state will inevitably fail. This means that the rulers must be willing to use whatever means are necessary to promote their own interests (ie. the interests of the state). If the ruler is not amoral in their actions, seeking only strategy and the intelligent use of power for the desired ends then outside powers which are amoral or immoral shall win the day, and the state will fall. Machiavelli's state has two principal means of pursuing its ends: through force and propaganda.(18) Force may be conceived of as equal to coercive action. It demands the existence of a proper military (Machiavelli demands a popular militia as opposed to armed mercenaries, claiming them to be the basis of any just state). Without a capable military a state is incapable of having good laws, states Machiavelli, and similarly, without good laws a state is unable to maintain a good military.(19) Machiavelli rejects militarist governments with their assumption of rank and the rule of the government in favor of a civilian run state (despite the military orientation of the government) with a rule of law or legalist system. The laws must apply equally to all within the populace for maximum efficiency and morality.(20) If force is the negative means of using power, in the sense of rule through the inspiration of the people and the state's enemies with fear, then propaganda is the obverse side of the same coin, seeking to manipulate the people's loves and good will in order to promote the interests of the state. One type of propaganda is that of state religion, according to Machiavelli. If religion is properly used than it not only becomes a motivation for the people of the state to act in a moral and just fashion, but also to support the state as they would support God. The use of religion as a tool of statecraft is thus the manipulation of the very core of the human character (note that this manipulation is very different from the alteration of character, a concept which Machiavelli rejects as unfeasible and impossible). Furthermore, religion can be used to instill a sense of loyalty and militancy in the citizens' militia without parallel. Thus, the positive tools of propaganda may be used to reinforce the negative ones of force.(21) A further note on propaganda would refer to the role of pomp. By this term Machiavelli is referring to the public use of ceremony and punishment to manipulate the populace.(22) For instance, if for some crime an individual is publicly beheaded in a formal ceremony which is of the greatest embarrassment to the family and the awe of the citizenry, then the act will serve as a deterrent to future acts of the same nature. If formal celebrations and religious ceremonies are conducted to the joy and awe of the people upon each accomplishment of the state and some means of compensation if provided to the citizens as a reward for their loyalty to the state and their part in the advancement thereof, then the citizens will begin to develop not only a sense of loyalty to the state (which would develop over time regardless just so long as the state continues to improve their lives) but a sense of pride and duty for the sake of duty, what I call the libido national. Thus far we have examined the means of the state as enunciated by Machiavelli, noting his strongly held Aristolean principles of flexibility and compromise. Hobbes takes a radically different course in his realism, however. Hobbesian realism is authoritative and unbending, being based on the precept that for humanity to in any way be moral or successful it must submit itself absolutely to the dominion of a despot, giving up all freedoms and most rights in order achieve some modicum of stability. The ruled must be absolutely relegated to the position of sheep, following the course plotted for them by their herder, or else risk the wrath of the herder as the individual is sacrificed for the good of the whole. In Hobbes' social contract, again, an absolutely necessary construct for a state to be established (in his philosophy), the ruled give over their unique freedoms and most of their rights to the ruler in exchange for security and order, both of which provide a means for the individual to continue to better their lives.(23) The relief from the war of all makes it possible for the human being to gain property without fear of its destruction and maintain a safe household without fear of death or eminent war. Human freedom may then begin to exist within a construct of force and coercion. Furthermore, Hobbes is quite insistent on the despotic nature of the ruler.(24) He prefers a single authority with absolute control, primarily due to the fact that he perceives a unified and singular source of legitimacy would be the most capable of stabilizing the state into his "leviathan." However Hobbes insists that no matter what form of government is in place in a particular state, that government, if it is successful, it is inherently despotic, regardless of whether it is a monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy.(25) Hobbes also seeks to use theology in his political structure, similarly to Machiavelli. Since the ruler is to be an absolute monarch, the ruler's authority should also be expanded to include the role of head priest, therefore making the service of the state both a political and religious duty and increasing the stability of the state.(26) Also, it is important to note that Hobbes seeks to make a distinction between the terms of repression and suppression. For Hobbes "the task of the sovereign is not to repress men, but to create the conditions under which they can express their individuality."(27) The ruler is to suppress the war of all by suppressing those elements of the human character which are conducive to anarchism, not repress the human being's capability to express itself.(28) A final note of interest is Hobbes concept of power as justification. Essentially Hobbes reasons that since God is absolutely powerful and absolutely just, the two must be complementary. As Warrender puts it, "Hobbes contends that 'power irresistible justifies all actions . . . less power does not; and so God is justified in all he does, though Hobbes is careful to add that what is justice in God would not be necessarily be justice in us.'"(29) What are the most important lessons to be drawn from the work of Machiavelli and Hobbes? Realism. Machiavelli's great contribution is his lesson of amoral flexibility, his unique understanding of the human state as necessarily pragmatic, an entity which must pursue moral ends through amoral means. Hobbes teaches that our democracies and mixed governments are in fact just a way for us to check up on the despotic system which we erect to prevent anarchism and provide the basic services of life. These men are realistic. They refuse to cow to the pseudo-idealists who curse them in the light of day and pour over their works by night. Machiavelli and Hobbes are not afraid of the evil which is so pervasive in society, rather the embrace it and enlighten it, twisting the self-interested desires of the individual into the communal ends of society. They try to make everyone happy by helping them to see their own dark sides. |
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Endnotes
1. Jones 27
2. Jones 27
3. Bréhier Seventeenth 1
4. Bréhier 148
I also use here the words of Germino and
Hobbes himself in a description of the State of Nature:
Hobbes's description of the natural condition of mankind (usually
referred to as the state of nature, although he himself does not
use this term) is deservedly famous. For Hobbes, the state of
nature, or anarchy, is analogous to a state of war among
organized societies:
In such condition, there is no
place for industry; because the fruit
thereof is uncertain: and
consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of
the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious
buildings; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no
account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is
worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.
Germino 100
5. Germino 99
6. Burnham 72
7. de Grazia 80;182-3
I include a brief quote from de Grazia (80) on ambition: "Men Leap from One Ambition to Another," a chapter title in the Discourses begins. Ambition associated with greed is closely related to lusting after and jockeying for personal power. Every man hopes "to climb up, oppressing this one, now that." Ambition "is so powerful in human breasts that no matter to what rank they rise it never deserts them. Even the "noblest writers [of the history of Florence] . . . fooled themselves and showed that they knew little of the ambition of men. . .," the Florentine Histories states. As a 'natural instinct' associated with greed, "Ambition ruling everywhere" infects the human mind. From the time if Cain, the violence of ambition cuts into the arteries of states and spurts out civil bloodshed and war.
8. Holmes 134-5
9. Warrender 312
10. Schuchet 60-1
11. Schuchet 64
12. Burnham 70-1;79-80
Germino 32;39;53
13. Germino 29-30
14. Germino 28
15. Bréhier 147-8
Germino 100-8
Strauss 21
16. Burnham 70-1;78;80
Germino 22-3;31;39;41;49
Skinner 15-6
17. Burnham 80-1
de Grazia 183-4
Germino 28;37;48
18. Germino 29;42
Jones 30-2
Skinner 18;31
19. de Grazia 93;103
Germino 29
20. Burnham 79
Germino 31-2
21. de Grazia 101;93
Germino 22-3;27
22. de Grazia 331-3
23. Bréhier 145
Germino 102-4
24. Bréhier 148
Germino 102;105;108-9
Warrender 319
25. Wolin 29
26. Bréhier 5;142;151
Germino 98;114-5
27. Germino 102
28. Germino 102;109
Holmes 140
Wolin 29
29. Warrener 315
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