In my younger years I was a student of physics. One of the greatest lessons I derived from this great science is that of the basic relationship of order and chaos: the more entropic a situation is, the greater the level of force which must be exerted to instigate a situation of order. When examining the history of policy in the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) the observer may note a similar system at work: as the leaders of the PRC perceive an increase in threat to order (in other words their particular order in which they and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remain firmly in control) from either internal or external sources, these leaders tend to react by exerting political power in direct equal to or greater than that of the perceived threat.

In the Chinese hierarchical system we find three basic levels: the alpha oligarchy, the coordinating oligarchy, and the bureaucracy. The alpha oligarchy, presided over by the preeminent leader⁽¹⁾, is primarily concerned with "macropolicy," the broad goals and general precepts of national policy. These twenty-five to thirty-five leaders generally take only a passive role in the policy making process, approving and disapproving policy of significance, with the exception of certain "pet issues" which they perceive as particularly essential. The alpha oligarchy represent the point of convergence of the highest ranks of both the PRC government and the cadre of the CCP.

On the other hand we find the bureaucracy, those ministries which are concerned with the creation of and implementation of "micropolicy." Micropolicy is simply detailed and intensive (in the sense of level of necessary expertise and man-hours) particular policy. Somewhere in between the grand scale of the macropoliticians and the microimplementors we find the forgers of mesopolicy, the coordinating oligarchs. These individuals, dependent on the current regime for their authority and legitimacy, represent a blend of particular specialization in a field in question and an understanding of the ultimate goals and pervading attitudes among the upper realms of the hierarchy. Their goal is simply this: to coordinate the many bureaucracies and their separate goals and interests with those of the upper oligarchy into a single, cohesive and viable body, thereby eliminating bureaucratic lag, a task at which they are more or less successful depending upon the situation in question. This accomplished largely through the creation of loose "bundles," bundles of bureaucracies and bundles of leaders along functional lines. The former are known as xitong,⁽²⁾ the latter kou. The xitong are simply clumps of bureaucracies with interests and goals which are similar and/or overlapping, whereas the kou, Chinese for "gateway" are just that: the point at which upper hierarchic and bureaucratic interests meet. Kou are composed of leaders of the various ministries represented in their corresponding party and governmental specialties and are led by junior members of the oligarchy.⁽³⁾

The kou/xitong system is a natural response to China's dynamism in the last half century. It may be seen as a fluid mechanism designed to cope with the increasing level of complexity of both society and the state necessary to govern that society, as well as to the increasing level of incorporation of the PRC into the international order. The equation is a simple one: China has begun to develop into a modernized state. Modernized states are extremely complex and should their mechanics be based on an overly centralized set of institutions, then these institutions will be unable to keep up and will either lose control of the system or will act as a drag on the dynamics of that system. This is not to insist that the state cannot maintain a high level of centralization or institutionalization and bureaucratization, but rather that this level of centralization must be kept in balance with the state's financial, technological, and psycho-cultural ability to maintain that centralization effectively. As the scale and complexity of statecraft in China continues to increase, the central government has been unable to maintain an iron grip on its power, in the sense that it remains officially omnipotent, but lacks omnipresence and omniscience. Therefore it has been forced to allow power to be increasingly dispersed into both the bureaucracy and society in some fields in order to maintain the ultimate legitimacy and authority of the regime. This is both to be expected and is observable.⁽⁴⁾

However, the history of the PRC has not been one which has followed some theoretical straight line, and indeed, we find numerous examples of real, if temporary, reversals in the trend towards increasing complexity leading to increasing dispersion of power. At various times in history the oligarchy has reconcentrated power towards the center, resulting in a necessary simplification of policy. At times, such as during the Cultural Revolution, the PRC has been utterly without international ties (having withdrawn all or most of their diplomatic corps), has had virtually no bureaucracy save for the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA), and policy has been narrowed to the simplicity of slogans. While generally, especially since the beginning of Deng's reforms, such centralization/simplifications have not been so dramatic, all have included an assertion of authority by the central government and a corresponding simplification of policy until power is again redispersed. Why is this the case?

Let us return to our discussion of physics. When the oligarchs look at the world, they are largely looking for forces which they perceive as capable of entering the order which they have fostered (an order based upon their legitimacy and authority) into a state of chaos or threatening their absolute priorities. When such a threat is perceived, be it the threat of internal counter-revolutionists, the former Soviet Union, the United States, of Taiwan declaring itself independent, or anything else, these oligarchs perceive themselves as being acted upon by a force or forces, forces which they naturally seek to counteract in order to maintain stability and order (and therefore their particular interests as well).⁽⁵⁾ When in the PRC these threats have been perceived as monstrous and/or monolithic, the oligarchs have reacted by attempting to make China into a monolithic entity in and of itself, an entity utterly unified in form and policy dictated from the top down. This simplification of form and function to the extreme may be contrasted to the latter day simplification reactions, such as the Tiananmen Square fiasco and the 1995 Straits Crisis between China and the United States. In both cases the upper cadre have dramatically simplified policy without referring to the bureaucracy or coordinating oligarchs, yet bureaucratic restructuring and policy simplification was limited to only those fields in which the top leaders felt it was absolutely necessary. Why? Simply put, because the Chinese oligarchy had become savvy enough to recognize that the situations were certainly not monolithic (though perhaps monstrous) and that ultimately the costs of ultra-simplification were far higher than the net returns of such actions. Regardless, the point remains that the PRC/CCP cadre continued to follow the basic precept that perception of forces capable of instilling chaos into their particular order requires centralization of power, which by necessity requires simplification of policy. The cadre have simply learned that all that is necessary is force in kind to offset contrary force, not overwhelming and self-destabilizing force. Furthermore, the high level of complexity and development in post-Maoist China has not only dramatically increased the level of force necessary to simplify the current order, but has in fact increased the relative costs of the obliteration of that order's complexity.⁽⁶⁾

In summation we find two main points. The high concentration of the power in the upper reaches of the PRC/CCP's political hierarchy has historically allowed it to coagulate power into a singularity with phenomenal (if not necessarily beneficial) speed and results, and that this simplification of power and policy is a result of the upper cadre perceiving immediate and leviathan threats (either internally or externally) to either their particular legitimacy and authority or to the existence of the PRC in general. In other words, the upper echelons have been attempting to counter force with force in kind, a drive that continues to motivate simplification policy today in crisis situations. However today the cadre have neither the concentration of power to work from as a point of reference nor the impetus to act on such a colossal scale. The latter fact is derived from the PRC's cadre gaining a greater and more mature understanding of the scale of the forces at work against them, an understand which therefore allows them to answer force with more appropriate force. It is not the principle that has changed, simply the vantage.