China had reigned as a power unmatched in time immemorial at the dawn of the Nineteenth Century. For countless centuries the Chinese Empire stood at the apex of human endeavor, continually one of the largest, most technologically and culturally advanced states in history. China was Zhong Guo, the Middle Kingdom, the central hub of both the geographic earth and her human residents. The Emperor was the Father of all the people of the world, his responsibility to maintain and extend the essence of the Empire and her principles to as many of his children as possible.⁽¹⁾ Those who had accepted and conformed were Chinese, the rest, barbarians. The idea of distinguishing people into "citizens" of the Empire was moot.

Then came the boats.

When the Chinese first began to interact with Westerners, the Empire desperately attempted to maintain the status quo. The Chinese refused to acknowledge the concept of equal states, and attempted to push the Westerners into the traditional role of the tribute-bearing inferiors. Such was not to be, and soon disputes between the Imperial government and the Western states escalated, allowing the newcomers to illustrate their definite military and technological advantage over both the Empire and those various partisans who sought to challenge the West's growing authority in China. The Chinese were crushed at every turn, and their physical defeat was accompanied by a psychological one. The Chinese sought a new route, a better way to organize themselves, to save themselves. A new framework had to be developed, new social infrastructure had to be adopted. The model? The very entities which had so ravaged the once great Empire: the Western powers.

As the Chinese began to study the various Western political and social tracts, both historical and contemporary, several concepts wholly alien to Chinese social and political thought began to emerge.⁽²⁾ The Western trinity of the irretractably unified nation, state, and country began to take root, along with the many more particular aspects thereof.⁽³⁾ Among the many concepts which began to etch themselves on the Chinese intellectual psyche was that of the citizen. And certainly, the question of what defines a citizen remains an issue of particular importance to the modern Chinese, especially considering the modern world's mass-migrations, China's recent acquisition of Hong Kong and future integration of Macao, the continued persecution of the Overseas Chinese, particularly in Southeast Asia, and the persistence of nationalism among non-Han minorities of China, particularly Chinese Muslims, Tibetans, Mongols, and the various minorities of South China.

But before one may begin the process of discussing modern Chinese sentiments on citizenship, perhaps one should seek to deliniate the history of the development of the concept of citizenship. Conceivably the most important period of transition is that which stretches from the waning days of the Ching dynasty to the close of the so-called 'Bandung Period' of PRC politics, a period that sees the nature of China's interpretation of jus sanguinis evolve at an exponential rate.

The documentary history of the Chinese concept of citizenship begins with the adoption of the principle of jus sanguinis as the basis of Chinese citizenship. In essence, this axiom holds that the citizenship of an individual should rightfully be passed to an individual through their line of descent. Therefore a proponent of jus sanguinis would hold that regardless of where and individual is born, that individual acquires the citizenship of their genitor. Naturally, the particular nature of such a "law of descent" varies from state to state. For instance, most modern states hold that the child of a citizen from X state born anywhere in world may claim citizenship in X state through descent. The primary difference between this particular stance in jus sanguinis and that of Imperial China is the point that lineage is, in the Chinese system, continued despite regardless of the individuals particular desire and the Chinese system's refusal to acknowledge the possibility of separation of nation/culture and state.⁽⁴⁾ In modern Israel we find some similarities, as anyone who can prove a Jewish lineage through their mother's line may claim citizenship, while the contemporary government of Mexico is considering giving all individuals of Mexican descent who are citizens of the United States dual citizenship, regardless of particular individual choice, in order to foster continued remittances from Mexican Americans across the border while insuring that those individuals receive the right to remain in American territory (and therefore build capital which again, may be sent across the border) that accompanies citizenship.

On the other hand we find the maxim of jus soli. Essentially, this concept holds that citizenship is derived from the territory in which an individual is born. Nearly every state holds some form of this to be the case, though often times in correlation with some level of jus sanguinis. Examples of variation in jus soli include the United States, where common law and the Supreme Court have both held that any individual born in the territory of the United States is entitled to citizenship therein. Several other states, however, have historically limited their citizenship by jus soli to members of particular ethnicities, religions, or nationalities. Other states have limited citizenship jus soli to those individuals whom are willing to first take part in a period of public service, military or otherwise, as in the various ancient Greek city-states as well as modern Switzerland and Israel.

In China, however, early on we find the adoption of both of these principles. First, we find that all individuals living within the territory of China, regardless of ethnicity, are 'made' Chinese citizens (a moot point due to the multiethnic composition of the Ching Dynasty). Then, as Edgar Wickburn notes:

China's 1909 Citizenship Law established the principle that
children of a Chinese father remained Chinese citizens regardless
of any other citizenship they might acquire overseas. (This principle
remained in force for all mainland Chinese governments to the end
of the 1950s and remains in effect in Taiwan even today)."⁽⁵⁾

The 1909 Citizenship Law was then reiterated by the Republican 1929 Citizenship Law which "recognized as Chinese citizens all children of Chinese fathers, wherever their birth."⁽⁶⁾ Furthermore, that law made "no provision for rejection or loss of Chinese citizenship through acquisition of another nationality except with permission of China's Ministry of Interior."⁽⁷⁾ Why is this the case? Let us examine the possible logic behind these decisions. First, on the political side, the adoption of the former was essential if China was to maintain its territorial integrity, a point no doubt further solidified in the Chinese mind by the adoption of the nation-state ideal and its demand for absolute and delineated boundaries. Also, by extending the citizenry to the members of the non-Han peoples, thereby giving them a stake in the larger Empire and hopefully offsetting their own nationalist tendencies. Also, the extension of citizenship was likely intended as an experiment in nation-building. As for the latter, there are no doubt two distinct motivations for such an action. First, the Chinese Empire continued to hold that it was the Middle Kingdom and that all Han Chinese were inherently subject to the direct sovereignty (as opposed to suzreignty) of the Emperor. Were the Chinese Empire to reject those Chinese not within its territorial boundaries it would be rejecting tenants essential to the Empire's legitimacy: that the Emperor's authority had no geophysical boundaries and that the Emperor held authority over all human beings. To undermine such tenets would dramatically undercut the already threadbare claims to legitimacy to which the Ching Empire still clung.

If one turns to the economic side, however, one quickly finds that China, like already mentioned Mexico, was highly dependent on remittances and investment from Overseas Chinese as a means of acquiring capital for the costly processes of modernization and industrialization. Without such monies the Chinese knew that the road towards such modernization would be considerably more difficult, if not impossible.⁽⁸⁾

I would also conjecture that another possible motivation for the Chinese extension of citizenship may have been the particular manner in which the Chinese had come to perceive the institutions of race and nation. Largely as a result of the social Darwinist trends in sociology, anthropology, and political geography at the time, particularly in Germany, the United States, and Japan, the Chinese came to view the concepts of race and nation as inextricably connected. Furthermore, if the Chinese race was to survive in the face of intense competition against the white race, then the Chinese would have to use the modern Western institution of nationalism to fully access the combined will and resources of the Chinese people as a whole regardless of geographic location. Indeed, the Chinese were well aware of the expansion of the Westerners and of their own historical expansion, and following in kind with the social Darwinist theory of lebensraum, the Chinese likely perceived the spread of the Chinese people throughout the world, but particularly Southeast Asia, may have in someway been a symbol that the Chinese culture had not lost all of its competitive vigor. Therefore the act of integrating the Overseas Chinese into the mainland citizenry through active legislation may have been provoked by cultural/political and economic, as well as by racial/ethnic/nationalist theory.

While originally there may have been minimal issue with the Chinese claims of jus sanguinis, ultimately this was not to be the case. This is largely the result of the increasing power of the Chinese Communist Party, culminating in the foundation of the PRC, and the simultaneous rise of nationalist sentiments among the colonies and former colonies of Southeast Asia. The Communists, and thus the Overseas Chinese through connection, were perceived as a potential threat to the capitalist/nationalist regimes of the region, and with the consolidation of power in 1949 China appeared capable of exerting real force in the international arena. Furthermore, as the colonies began to achieve their independence, long fostered enmity against the Overseas Chinese, who were often perceived of as collaborators with the colonial regime, began to boil over. Also, a disgust with the success of the Overseas Chinese in comparison with the native populations often further increased tensions.⁽⁹⁾ By maintaining the particular policy of jus sanguinis both the Republic and PRC (who both continued the policy originally concieved under the Empire) were, not altogether unjustly, perceived as actively supporting the continued special position of the Overseas Chinese and ultimate overthrow of the nationalist regimes in which they resided.

While the PRC did, in fact, attempt to support the Overseas Chinese, again for the sake of maintaining the flow of remittances and investment⁽¹⁰⁾ and because of ethnic nationalism, though now largely devoid of its lebensraum aspects,⁽¹¹⁾ it also sought to develop and maintain positive, if not friendly, relationships among the newly independent states of Southeast Asia. The relationship to Indonesia may serve as an example of the PRC's dramatic shift in the understanding of the concept of the citizen as the Bandung Period dawned.

In the days before Bandung the PRC initially upheld the precedent of the former Imperial and Republican governments. This is well illustrated in two documents of considerable significance to the early PRC: the Electoral Law of 1953 and the 1954 Constitution of the Peoples' Republic of China. Both of these documents affirm the PRC's relationship with the Overseas Chinese and accord them representation in the National People's Congress.⁽¹²⁾ Within the bureaucracy the PRC established the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission which was subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party's concurrent organ, the United Front Work Department.⁽¹³⁾

In an effort to simultaneously improve the lot of the Overseas Chinese and improve their relations with Indonesia (and thus lay the foundations of better relations in Southeast Asia in general) the Chinese began to actively moderate their position concerning jus sanguinis from 1954 to 1957. It was during this time, in April of 1955, the Bandung Conference was held in Indonesia, with the PRC in attendance. Bandung was one of the highlights of the nonaligned movement, a movement which China hoped to become the spiritual (and literal) leader of. Zhou Enlai, the leader of China's contingent, made to statements which may be perceived as precursors to China's breaking formal political ties with the Overseas Chinese. First, Zhou outlined China's stance toward the Third World, stating:

China consistently opposes imperialism, hegemonism and
colonialism, works to strengthen unity with the people of other
countries, [and] supports the oppressed nations and the developing <
countries in their just struggle to win and preserve national
independence. . . .⁽¹⁴⁾

With this assurance that China did not intend to extend its power, either through direct or indirect means over the various states of the Third World, including Indonesia, the PRC coupled the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which China had worked out with India in April of 1954. The Principles, now extended to all Third World states, were: (1) mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) mutual non-interference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, (5) and peaceful coexistence.⁽¹⁵⁾ The People's Republic was, in principle, giving up its right to intervene in the territory of outside states. It takes only simply inference to recognize the significance such a move has in regards to the Overseas Chinese. The PRC had, in theory, given up the "right" to intervene in any form which violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of another state unless its own sovereignty had first been compromised. This was meant to be an assurance that the PRC did not intend to manipulate the Overseas Chinese in such a manner as to be antithetical to the survival of the states of their residency.⁽¹⁶⁾

This did not resolve the jus sanguinis issue altogether though, and in an effort to improve relations with Indonesia the Chinese began to actively negotiate a new stance regarding the status of the Overseas Chinese. This initially resulted in the Dual Citizenship Treaty of 1955, signed by Zhou Enlai and Indonesian Foreign Minister Soenario. This treaty allowed Overseas Chinese to "renounce their Chinese citizenship by filing a declaration choosing Indonesian citizenship within a two-year period after the. . .ratification of the treaty."⁽¹⁷⁾ This treaty was troubling, however, to those Chinese who had already been integrated into the Indonesian citizenry, largely because it required that they go through a long process of verifying their citizenship with the state or risk losing it. Regardless, Indonesia insisted that the nature of the treaty remain in just such a form. The Dual Citizenship Treaty was ratified in both the PRC and Indonesia in December of 1957.⁽¹⁸⁾

Yet by 1959 relations began to break down between the PRC and Indonesia as anti-Chinese sentiments began to grow in the latter, delaying implementation of the treaty was not to be implemented until January of 1960.⁽¹⁹⁾ The Indonesian government then began to step by step eliminate the ability of the Overseas Chinese to participate meaningfully in the Indonesian economy. This included the May 14^th, 1959 regulation which forbade trade by aliens "outside of the capital towns of first- and second-level autonomous areas. . . ."⁽²⁰⁾ This was then followed by military regulations which required all Chinese to leave rural areas by December 31^st. These regulations were later combined and altered by Presidential Regulation Number 10/1959 which continued the original prohibition of trade but allowed the Chinese to remain in their homes unless local military leaders felt that, in the interest of security, such a move was necessary.⁽²¹⁾ This led to a mass exodus of Overseas Chinese in 1960 with over 100,000 "returning" to China that year.⁽²²⁾

Needless to say, these events nearly obliterated Indonesian and PRC relations. In an effort for reproachment, the two governments agreed to affect the enactment of the Dual Citizenship Treaty in In their efforts to reach a mutual interpertation of the treaty, the two parties had two major sticking points. First, the PRC wanted exemption from registration expanded to include all Chinese who participated in elections, an article based on the premise that by voting, those individuals were illustrating their loyalty to the Indonesian government. Secondly, the Chinese felt that those minors born between 1949 and 1951 whose parents had rejected Indonesian citizenship 1960.⁽²³⁾ Furthermore, the PRC sought to give all Overseas Chinese born in Indonesia the "option of choosing Indonesian citizenship, irrespective of whether they had previously rejected it. Thus, China's attitude was in contrast to her traditional claim to the loyalty of all persons of Chinese descent."⁽²⁴⁾

During this "Bandung Period" we have seen the People's Republic of China shift away from the traditional Chinese stance of 'absolute jus sanguinis' towards a considerably different system. ⁽²⁵⁾ This system not only recognized the principle of jus soli in foreign territories, but also sought to actively disassociate from former claims of sovereignty over individuals of Chinese descent. The reasons are numerous. First, China was attempting to solidify its place in the world and build a platform of legitimacy. The act of actively assuring its neighbors that China had no intention of using the Overseas Chinese to achieve some despicable and underhanded end was a major step in the direction of what China hoped would result in full recognition of the PRC and the accompanying external legitimation. Further, China continued to recognize the importance of foreign remittances from the Overseas Chinese, but realized that in the post-colonial world those remittances would be best assured by insuring the safety and stability of the Overseas Chinese, an end best met by integrating them into their 'host country's' political system vis-a-vis citizenship. Overseas Chinese forced to return to China resulted in a proportionate drop in capital transferred from outside sources into the PRC. Somers argues that the primary motivation for the extended Chinese efforts to settle the issue of Overseas Chinese was to win Indonesian support for the PRC in the Indian border conflict, yet I think that this motivation may simply be seen as a part of China's broader aim to gain international support and legitimization.

In summation, we find that the Chinese perspective concerning the concept of jus sanguinis from the last days of the Empire through the Bandung Period tends to be controlled by two major motivations, both pragmatic. The first of these is the desire to attain and maintain legitimacy and authority. During the Empire this necessitated the maintenance of the traditional Imperial institutions of diplomacy in order to legitimate that regime's existence despite the fact that the self-same institutions are counter to the international order which has evolved around China. At the dawn of the PRC, however, we find a regime not only not tied to the same conservative institutions but drawing its legitimacy from an entirely different base, including the idea of the revolutionary state overthrowing the former classist state's archaic concoctions. Furthermore, the PRC actively seeks to bolster its own legitimacy internationally as well, providing a push during the Bandung Period to increasingly conform to international standards concerning citizenship.

Secondly, we find that the various Chinese regimes are all motivated by a need for capital, though the understanding of how to best facilitate the transfer of capital differs between regimes. During the Imperial and Republican periods the Chinese tended lean towards the idea that the best way to insure the flow of investment and remittances was through a claim of direct protection over the Overseas Chinese. Yet as the PRC rose to power the world entered a stage of post-colonialism. This situation caused the promise of Chinese protection over ethnically Chinese in Southeast Asia to become a negative as the newly founded regimes of the region perceived such a concept as a threat to their sovereignty, leading to persecutions of Overseas Chinese and subsequent drops in foreign capital flowing to the mainland. Therefore the PRC took such steps as were necessary to politically assimilate the Overseas Chinese into their states of residence, insuring a continued flow of capital under the new circumstances. When these motivations are further highlighted when taken in the context of the shifting Chinese understanding of social-political-economic evolution from a nationalist to a Marxist model with the fall of the Republic and empowerment of the PRC.

Endnotes

1. Brown 223; 233

2. Tsou 273-279

3. This is, of course, the modern nation-state. This entity, at least theoretically, based on the idea that a state (being a sovereign government) should rule over a particular territory (being a country) in a form representing the interests of a particular people (the nation).

4. Elegant 38

5. Wickburn 74

6. Somers 10

7. Somers 10

Regarding this subject also see Wang 25; 223

8. Elegant 166

Garver 200-201; 204; 220; 232-233

It is of note that in this stage there was little real issue in those countries in which the Overseas Chinese resided with the Chinese claims of lineal jus sanguinis. The cause of this is simple: the utter domination of the Western powers at this time. In the Western countries themselves, there was little to fear from the declarations of the Chinese Empire and no real pressure to alter their policies in accordance, though the 1909 Citizenship Law likely provided fodder for the arguments of xenophobic nativists in countries such as the United States where anti-immigrant movements were swelling. As for the colonies of those states many of these were quite pleased with having the Chinese with their particular skills available, skills which generally increased the wealth of the colony and therefore the overall value of the investment of the mother state in the subjugated state. As to the issue of the Overseas Chinese being able to claim Chinese citizenship, there was already considerable precedent for dual citizenship among Western states, therefore loyalty to China was not necessarily perceived as a threat to either the legitimacy or security of the colonizing state.

9. Cariño 21-22

Committee for Free Asia 29

Elegant 38-39

Yen 19-31

10. Cariño 9-11

Officially outlined in the 1949 Common Programme, Article 37.

11. Brown 3; 44; 140; 234; 235; 277

I would conjecture this to be a direct result of the dramatic change in the nature of evolutionary social/political/economic theory with the rise of Marxist/Leninist/ Stalinist/Maoist thought.

12. Cariño 8

13. Cariño 9

14. The Office of Tibet/Government of Tibet in Exile (web)

15. Garver 122

16. Williams 122

17. Elegant 38; 39

Fried 8

Somers 14

Tan 236

18. Somers 24

19. Tan 237

Tan also notes that one of the key events in disrupting Sino-Indonesian relations during this period would be the high level of rejection of Indonesian citizenship, an act that sparked latent Indonesian concerns of an indigenous Chinese threat.

20. Somers 24

21. Somers 25

22. Somers 26

23. Somers 31

24. Somers 31-32

The Indonesians were especially leery of the latter of these. Somers notes, "Even after the joint committee reached an agreement, the Indonesian cabinet refused to accept the provision allowing option of citizenship to all those who lost Indonesian citizenship as minors in 1949-51. Cabinet members expressed a fear that this would allow those youths who had been educated and "indoctrinated" in China to return to Indonesia. Settlement came only after President Soekarno intervened personally on behalf of the Chinese viewpoint, emphasizing that friendship with China was more important than these trivial considerations. . . .Nevertheless, Foreign Minister Subandrio persuaded Chinese Ambassador Huang Chen to agree that the concession was meant only for those youths who had remained in Indonesia. (31-32)

25. For development of other similar treaties paralleling Sino-Indonesian developments see Gilks 193-194 and Chang 9.

Bibliography

-Brown, Melissa J. Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies (University of California, Berkeley), 1995.

-Chang Pao-min. Beijing, Hanoi, and the Overseas Chinese. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies (University of California, Berkeley), 1982.

-Coriño, Theresa Chong. China and the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1985.

-Dikötter, Frank. The Discourse of Race in Modern China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992

-Elegant, Robert S. The Dragon's Seed: Peking and the Overseas Chinese. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959.

-Fried, Morton H., edtr. Colloquium on Overseas Chinese. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1958.

-Garver, John W. Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993.

-Gilks, Anne. The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979. Berkeley: Institute for East Asian Studies (University of California, Berkeley), 1992.

-"Non-aligned Perceptions: from Delhi to Cartagena"; The Office of Tibet/Government of Tibet in Exile. http://www.tibet.com/Humanrights/Unpo/chap4.html (accessed 4/23/99)

-Oxfeld, Ellen. Blood, Sweat, and Majong: Family Enterprise in an Overseas Chinese Community. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.

-Skeldon, Ronald, edtr. Reluctant Exiles?: Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas Chinese. London: M.E. Sharpe, 1994.

-Somers, Mary F. Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1964.

-A Symposium on The Political, Economic, and Cultural Position of the Overseas Chinese. Taipei (?): Committee for a Free Asia, 1953.

-Tan Giok-Lan. The Chinese of Sukabumi: A Study in Social and Cultural Accommodation. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1963.

-Tang Tsou. The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms: A Historical Perspective. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988.

-Two Faces of China: 1961. Overseas Chinese Publication Service, 1961.

-Wang Gungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academy Press, 1991.

-Williams, Lea E. The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966.

-Yen Ching-Hwang. Coolies and Mandarins. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985.